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SECURITY INTERESTS IN CROPS
Part One*
By MILO WEITNEY SMITHt
One of the oldest relationships recognized at law is that of debtor and
creditor. The unfortunate fact that there are far more of the former than
the latter, while the latter have usually had the financial influence, has led
to a constant battle between the two groups, with first one side and then the
other attaining the ascendancy in the attempt to obtain the most favorable
position in the law. But neither side can afford too great a victory, lest the
other perish. The law of security transactions is the focal point of this
struggle.
The problems which have arisen around this focus are so basic, and so
pervasive that it is almost impossible to deal with any segment of them
without invoking the entire body of the law. With this disability in mind,
the scope of this paper is nonetheless a restricted one-as restricted as is
possible.
The financing of agricultural operations is a tremendous field, and one
which has many ramifications, economic and social. Generally speaking,
the problems all center about a single source of rights-the crops produced
by the land. Each person who is involved in the process of producing and
financing the growing of crops is interested in obtaining for himself the
security of a prior right to those crops. The number of claimants to a single
crop can grow to alarming size, as each invokes the aid of the law to assure
himself of a tangible return for his investment of money or labor.
In treating the problem of these conflicting interests, it has been found
that certain areas have been fairly well mapped out; that certain interests
have been so regulated, or so defined, as to render discussion of them of
little value. But other interests are as yet unsettled, or involve resolutions
of the conflict which seem to be undesirable. It is to these areas that attention has been turned. Rather than attempting an analysis of the entire field
of rights in crops, it has been the purpose of this paper to treat the areas in
which it is felt that the law remains in a developing stage, or those areas in
which the law is confused.
The problem areas which have been selected may be considered in relation to the parties involved: The owner of land, the cultivator of the crop,
those who extend credit to either of these parties in return for a mortgage
* Editor's note: Part two of this article will appear in Volume 10, Number 2 of the Hastings Law Journal in November, 1958.
SB.A., 1947, State University of Iowa; J.D., 1950, State University of Iowa. Assistant
Professor of Business Law, University of California, Berkeley, California. Member of the California Bar.

[ 23]

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10

upon an interest in the crop, and those who extend credit in return for a
mortgage upon the land itself. To a large extent the rights of the mortgagees
of an interest in land or crop are determined by the nature of the rights
between the owner of the land and the party who is cultivating the crop.
This problem has been first explored. In the remaining sections, consideration has been given to certain aspects of the rights of a crop mortgagee and
a land mortgagee.

Rights of Lessor and Lessee
In any situation in which legal ownership is divorced from physical possession, there arise problems of the rights of the possessor as against the
owner, the owner as against the possessor, and third parties as against either
or both. Perhaps nowhere is this truism of more force than in the case of
agricultural property. Frequently the party to whom possession is given
(hereafter "cultivator") is an impecunious party with naught to offer but
his labor, and the owner of the property (hereafter "owner") looks not to
the cultivator personally, but rather to the fruits of the cultivator's labor
for satisfaction of his right to a return from the land. As a result, the granting of possession to the cultivator will be attended with attempts of varying
elaborateness to protect the owner's interest in the product of the soil. It is
with the success of these attempts that this section is concerned.
The contract under which the cultivator enters the land of the owner
may give rise to a bewildering variety of legal rights and obligations. Traditionaily, these have been categorized into a few major relationships, and
some relatively unimportant ones. The primary categories evoked by the
courts have been the "landlord-tenant,"' "cropping contract," 2 and "farming for shares." 3 Some cases have suggested that it is possible to create a
partnership between the owner and cultivator,4 and it has been occasionally
held that the relationship was merely that of employer-employee. 5 Assuming one of the primary relationships, there are terms which may be included
in the contract giving the right of possession to the cultivator which purport
to increase the owner's rights. These additional contract provisions may be
''7
lumped as "reservations of title," and "contracts to give a mortgage.
'See generally, Wnicr I, Su l-5ARY oF CALIinoRmA LAW, Real Property § 194 (1946);
14 CAL. JUR.2d, Crops § 12 (1952).
2 See generally, WITKIN, op. cit. supra note 1; 14 CAL. JUR. 2d, Crops § 31 (1952).
3 This term appears to be used in describing agreements which give rise to the relationship
of lessor-lessee as to the land, with a tenancy in common in the crops. See Smith v. Schultz,
89 Cal. 526, 26 Pac. 1087 (1891), and Walls v. Preston, 25 Cal. 59 (1864), discussed in text
following note 25 infra.
4Smith v. Schultz, 89 Cal. 526, 26 Pac. 1087 (1891) (theory raised and rejected). Cf. Erickson v. Rhee, 181 Cal. 562, 185 Pac. 847 (1919).
5Wentworth v. Miller, 53 Cal. 9 (1878) (title had been retained by owner).
6 See text following note 39 infra.
7See text following note 40 infra.
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The California courts, in attempting to assess the rights arising out of
the multiform contractual arrangements which can be made, have tended
to approach the problem through use of these traditional categories. This
approach is generally effective, but is subject to the inherent weakness of
any categorization-there is a tendency to lose sight of the results which
flow from the categories. This weakness is noticeable to some extent even
in cases which involve similarly situated parties; it is especially so when
a category which defines quite adequately the rights of parties inter se is
stretched so as to determine the rights of third parties.
As noted above, the primary division which has been made between the
contracts under which the cultivator holds possession of the owner's land
is that between "lease" and "cropping contract." Under a lease, it is normally held that title to growing crops is in the lessee exclusively,' and the
right to possession of the land for the term of the lease is also in the lessee.'
Where an agreement is characterized as a cropping contract, the rights are
not so clearly defined. Generally when the courts refer to a contractual
arrangement as a cropping contract, they intend to find a tenancy in common in the crops-title in both lessor and lessee to an undivided interestand no change in the right to the land, save insofar as the cultivator is entitled to possession to protect his interest in the crop."0 As a final confusing
note, the same agreement may create different rights as to the land than it
does as to the crops-i.e., be a lease of land, but with the attributes of a
cropping contract as to the rights in the crops.' To avoid this confusion it
is proposed to first consider the nature of the rights as between the parties,
distinguishing between those cases involving the right to land and those
involving the right to crops.
Lease or Cropping Contract?
In distinguishing between the lease and the cropping contract, certain
cases are clear. Where the contract calls for a stipulated rental payment, in
cash, there is but little doubt that the agreement is a lease.' The difficult
cases are those which involve a turning over-the word "payment" is
avoided intentionally-by the cultivator to the owner of a share of the crops.
Early California cases considering the nature of the right in the crops
created by an agreement to share the produce of the soil strongly favored
8 See note 29 infra.
9 Harrelson v. Miller & Lux, Inc., 182 Cal. 408, 188 Pac. 800 (1920) ; Walls v. Preston,
25 Cal. 59 (1864).
10
Walls v. Preston, 25 Cal. 59 (1864) ; Adams v. Thornton, 7 Cal. Unrep. 219, 82 Pac. 215
(1905).
11
See text at note 25 infra.
12See Ferguson v. Murphy, 117 Cal. 134, 48 Pac. 1018 (1897) ; Stockton Say. & L. Soc.
v. Purvis 112 Cal. 236, 44 Pac. 561 (1896).
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a categorization which would create a tenancy in common in the crops.
Bernal v. Hovious,8 the first case to consider such an agreement, involved
an agreement under the terms of which the owner was to provide seed, tools,
and implements. The cultivator furnished his labor. The agreement then
provided that the owner was to receive from the cultivator one-third of the
crop, sacked, and free from expense of threshing. In holding that the relationship of the parties to the crop was that of tenants in common, the court
said:14

The true test seems to lie in the question whether there be any provision,
in whatever form, for dividing the specific products of the promises. If there
be, a tenancy in common arises, at least in such products as are to be
divided.
This "true test" was followed in a series of later cases involving the
right to the crops.'6 But in Clarke v. Cobb" a telling blow was struck for
confusion. In this case, a purchaser of the land at a foreclosure sale and the
mortgagor were contending for the share of the crops set aside by the
tenant in possession as due under the terms of the agreement under which
he held possession. The purchaser claimed them as rent of the property,
due to him under section 707 of the Code of Civil Procedure,' 7 and, alternatively, that the interest of the mortgagor having been that of a tenant in
common, that the entire interest passed to the purchaser at foreclosure sale,
so that the mortgagor was entitled to none of the crop. The court held that
the agreement between the mortgagor and the tenant in possession, even
though calling for a turning over to the mortgagor of a share of the crops,
was, in fact, a lease, and that the share of the crops due the mortgagor was
merely a payment of rents due in kind. Rather than inferring a co-tenancy
in the crops from the fact of the agreement's calling for a division of the
produce, the court required that the agreement show in some way an intention to create that relationship. It might be noted on this point, that hitherto
the agreement to share the crops had shown this intention. But no longer
was this to be so, or so it appeared. Where the instrument as a whole more
nearly resembles a lease than a contract to create a co-tenancy, it will be
deemed a lease with rents payable in kind.
But two years later, in Curtner v. Lyndon' the court reverted to the
older rule. In point of fact, the decision did not even mention the basis for
.317 Cal. 541 (1861).

141d. at 546, quoting Putnam v. Wise, 1 Hill 235 (N.Y. 1834).
15 Woodsend v. Chatom, 191 Cal. 72, 214 Pac. 965 (1923) ; Jones v. Durrer, 96 Cal. 95,
30 Pac. 1027 (1892)

(semble) ; Smith v. Schultz, 89 Cal. 526, 26 Pac. 1087 (1891)

Howell v. Foster, 65 Cal. 169, 3 Pac. 647 (1884) ; Walls v. Preston, 25 Cal. 59 (1864).
16 121 Cal. 595, 54 Pac. 74 (1898).
'7 See discussion in text at note 152 infra (to be published in Vol. 10, No. 2).
18 128 Cal. 35, 60 Pac. 462 (1900).

(semble);
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holding the particular instrument to be a "cropping contract." Rather, the
reasoning of the court, in r~aching the conclusion that an owner had disposed of any attachable interest in a crop being grown by a cultivator, was
that the contract was a cropping contract, "therefore" the parties were
tenants in common in the crop. To add confusion, this remark was supported by a citation to Clarke v. Cobb.
With this conflicting authority to choose from, it is little wonder that
subsequent decisions have been divided as to the nature of the relationship
between the parties as to the crop. While it appears today that the preponderance of authority is to the effect that a provision for a sharing of the
crop is merely a stipulation for rent in kind,"9 it should be noted that three
of the cases so holding involve third parties who have damaged a crop, and
who are seeking to reduce the damages collectible by the cultivator on the
grounds that his interest in the crop is only that of a tenant in common.20
In one of the other cases so holding the point was conceded' and in only
one case is the point directly passed upon, and even in that case the court's
comment might be construed as an alternate grounds for decision.2 2 On the
other hand, the decisions holding the contract to be a cropping contract are
with one exception not of much weight either; one of them reaching this
conclusion and then holding that the rights of the parties were those of
employer-employee,' and another being of questionable precedent value.2m
But in Woodsend v. Chatom2 5 there is a square holding indicating preference for the tenancy in common. It would seem that a fair statement of the
situation is that the question is certainly open to argument, with the dictum
favoring the "lease" construction, and the holdings favoring the "cropping
contract" construction.
In analyzing the cases on this point, it is important to distinguish those
which deal with the problems of the rights to the land on which the crop
is grown, as opposed to the rights in the crops. This distinction was first
pointed out in Walls v. Preston," an action in forcible detainer, in which the
court held that the agreement between the owner and the cultivator, even
19 See Wolfsen v. Hathaway, 32 Cal. 2d 632, 198 P.2d 1 (1948) (point assumed); Shintaffer
v. Bank of Italy, 216 Cal. 243, 13 P.2d 668 (1932). See also cases discussed in notes imme-

diately following.
20 Holt Mfg. Co. v. Thornton, 136 Cal. 232, 68 Pac. 708 (1902); Goodwin v. Braden,
134 Cal. App. 2d 34, 285 P.2d 330 (1955) ; Hicks v. Butterworth, 30 Cal. App. 562, 159 Pac. 224
(1916).
2
1 Imperial Valley Land Co. v. Globe Grain & Milling Co., 187 Cal. 352, 202 Pac. 129
(1921).
22 Silveira v. Ohm, 33 Cal. 2d 272, 201 P.2d 387 (1949).
23
Smyth v. Tennison, 24 Cal. App. 519, 141 Pac. 1059 (1914).
24
Adams v. Thornton, 7 Cal. Unrep. 219, 82 Pac. 215 (1905).
25191 Cal. 72, 214 Pac. 965 (1923).
2825 Cal. 59 (1864).
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though it created a tenancy in common in the crop, gave rise to the landlordtenant relationship as to the land. This holding was followed for many
years,2 T again enduring until Clarke v. Cobb, in which case the rule was
considered and rejected, the court insisting that the relationship was one of
landlord-tenant in its entirety, and not merely as to the rights in land. Since
Clarke v. Cobb was concerned with the rights in the crops, the rejection
of the earlier rule is dictum, but certainly forcible. And, in Woodsend v.
Chatom, which again involved rights in crops, the "better rule" was stated
to be that of the earlier cases, Clarke v. Cobb being distinguished on its
facts.
Effects of Categorization
With the exception of the situations in which the owner seeks to hold
the cultivator to the duties of a tenant--.e., impose a "lease" relationship
upon him 2 8-- the distinction between a cropping contract and a lease is not
vital as between the parties. Whether the owner be a tenant in common in
the crops, or a landlord seeking his rent, he is entitled to the contractually
provided for share of the crops. It is with respect to the rights of the owner
and cultivator as against third parties that the distinction becomes most
important, and it is for this reason that the confusion in the cases is most
unfortunate. Where the only dispute is between the parties to an agreement, one may cast a pox on both their houses for failing to draw the agreement with greater precision, so as to avoid the difficulties of interpretation.
Unfortunately, the categories which determine the rights as between owner
and cultivator can have significant effects on the rights of third parties.
Thus, if the agreement is termed a lease with rent payable in kind, the title
to the crops is held to vest in the lessee. 9 As a result, the crops are subject
to whatever disposition he may make of them, prior to the lessor's obtaining possession of his share." They may be sold or encumbered, leaving the
lessor with a suit for the rent against his tenant. Or they may be attached
by a creditor of the lessees'--an even more unfortunate possibility, inas27 Jones v. Durrer, 96 Cal. 95, 30 Pac. 1027 (1892) ; Smith v. Schultz, 89 Cal. 526, 26 Pac.
1087 (1891).
28 See Harrelson v. Miller & Lux, Inc., 182 Cal. 408, 188 Pac. 800 (1920).
29 Silveira v. Ohm, 33 Cal. 2d 272, 201 P.2d 387 (1949) ; Clarke v. Cobb, 121 Cal. 595,
54 Pac. 74 (1898) ; Stockton Say. & L. Soc. v. Purvis, 112 Cal. 236, 44 Pac. 561 (1896) ; Blum
v. McHugh, 92 Cal. 497, 28 Pac. 592 (1891) ; Farnum v. Hefner, 79 Cal. 575, 21 Pac. 955 (1889) ;
Cox v. Miller, 15 Cal. App. 2d 494, 59 P.2d 628 (1936). See also cases cited and discussed in text
and note at note 39 infra. In all of these cases involving retention of title by the lessor, the
attempt is to circumvent this rule.
3OLemon v. Wolff, 121 Cal. 272, 53 Pac. 801 (1898) (mortgage).
31 Crocker v. Cunningham, 122 Cal. 547, 55 Pac. 404 (1898); Stockton Say. & L. Soc. v.
Purvis, 112 Cal. 236, 44 Pac. 561 (1896); Blum v. McHugh, 92 Cal. 497, 28 Pac. 592 (1891)
(semble).
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much as this procedure does not even give the lessee a cash consideration
against which the lessor can move. By the same token, they are immune
from creditors of the lessor, and can be disposed of by him only in futuro
-he cannot give good title as against one claiming under the lessee.82
On the other hand, if the relationship is that of tenants in common, then
neither party may sell the entire interest in the crop. 3 If such a sale is
effected, the party who made the sale and his vendee are converters of the
undivided interest of the other co-tenant .3 A crop mortgage given by either
-of the co-tenants is effective as to only the interest of the mortgagor, giving
the mortgagee a lien only on the undivided interest in the cropsY5 And the
crops are subject to seizure on attachment in an action against either of
the parties, but only to the extent of his undivided interest. 6
When such variegated results can ensue from a classification, it is indeed regrettable that one is unable with any assurance to determine just
what the classification may be. Certainly no one's interests are advanced
by the uncertainty in the law. Encumbrancers and purchasers may rightly
complain of the risks involved in taking a crop grown under an agreement
susceptible to varying interpretations, with drastically different legal consequences. While the author's personal preference is for the rule of Walls
v. Preston-thatan agreement giving the cultivator possession on shares
creates a tenancy in common in the crop, with the rights to the land being
in the nature of a leasehold-it is more important that there be a rule than
that there be this rule.
"Secret Lien" Cases
In view of the fact that the agreements for change of possession of agricultural land are so often oral,8 7 or at best informal unrecorded documents, 88 the uncertainties created by the confusion as to classification are
even more glaring. Strangely enough, it is just this factor of informality
and lack of recordation which has led to some of the most stringent rules
favoring third parties, in what may be referred to as the "secret lien" cases.
Basically, these cases involve attempts by an owner to provide himself with
82 See generally, 14 CAL. JuR. 2d, Crops § 33 (1952).

33 Woodsend v. Chatom, 191 Cal. 72, 214 Pac. 965 (1923) ; Baughman v. Reed, 75 Cal. 319,
17 Pac. 222 (1888).
34 Woodsend v. Chatom, 191 Cal. 72, 214 Pac. 965 (1923).
85

Acme Investment Corp. v. Thompson, 216 Cal. 335, 14 P.2d 87 (1932) ; Sunol v. Molloy,
63 Cal. 369 (1883). See Woodsend v. Chatom, supra note 34.
86 Sunol v. Molloy, 63 Cal. 369 (1883) ; see Curtner v. Lyndon, 128 Cal. 35, 60 Pac. 462

(1900).
37

Sections 1091 of the CAL. Civ. CODE and 1971 of the CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. require a
writing only for leases for a period of more than one year.
38 Section 1214 of the CAL. Civ. CODE requires recordation only if a lease is for a term of
more than one year.
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some additional assurance that he will be able to satisfy his claim for the
value of the use of his property out of the crops. Typically the device employed is either a retention of title of the entire crop in the owner39 or a
covenant by the lessee to execute a crop mortgage to secure the rents due.40
As between the owner and the cultivator, of course, such a provision is
effective to determine the rights.4 But the courts have shown an increasing reluctance to let the rights of third parties hinge upon such provisions.
The first California case to consider such a provision, Wentworth v.
Miller,42 involved a simple clause under which the owner was to receive
one-fourth of the crops as rent, with possession of the entire crop to remain
in him until this share was paid over. The provision was upheld as against
a purchaser from the lessee. In Howell v. Foster,43 a more elaborate clause
was involved, the owner there retaining title to the entire crop, which was
to be delivered in toto to him to be held as security for other advances.
Upon satisfaction of the advances, three-fourths of the crop would be
returned to the cultivator. Once more the provision was upheld.
But in Farnum v. Hefner, 44 involving a clause providing for retention
of title to the entire crop in the owner, and requiring delivery in toto to the
owner, who would upon receipt immediately return two-thirds to the cultivator, it was held that a purchaser of the cultivator's interest in the crop
became an involuntary assignee to the two-thirds share to be given the
cultivator, despite a prohibition on disposal or encumbrance. The court
severely restricted Howell v. Foster by distinguishing it on two grounds:
(1) that there was consideration for the retention of title in that case, in
that it was to protect the owner for other advances; and (2) that the rule
of that case was not applicable where the owner was to redeliver immediately to the cultivator. And in Blum v. McHugh,4 5 even more serious doubt
was cast on the efficacy of a clause reserving title in the owner to secure
39 Crocker v. Cunningham, 122 Cal. 547, 55 Pac. 404 (1898); Ferguson v. Murphy, 117

Cal. 134, 48 Pac. 1018 (1897); Marshall v. Luiz, 115 Cal. 622, 47 Pac. 597 (1897); Stockton
Say. & L. Soc. v. Purvis, 112 Cal. 236, 44 Pac. 561 (1896); Blum v. McHugh, 92 Cal. 497,
28 Pac. 592 (1891) ; Farnum v. Hefner, 79 Cal. 575, 21 Pac. 955 (1889) ; Hitchcock v. Hassett,
71 Cal. 331, 12 Pac. 228 (1886) ; Howell v. Foster, 65 Cal. 169, 3 Pac. 647 (1884) ; Wentworth
v. Miller, 53 Cal. 9 (1878); Tuohy v. Wingfield, 52 Cal. 319 (1877) (wool).
40 Bell v. Central Bank, 89 Cal. App. 551, 265 Pac. 551 (1928) ; Nau v. Santa Ana Sugar
Co., 79 Cal. App. 685, 250 Pac. 705 (1926).
41 Summerville v. Stockton Milling Company, 142 Cal. 529, 76 Pac. 243 (1904) ; Lemon
v. Wolff, 121 Cal. 272, 53 Pac. 801 (1898) ; Marshall v. Luiz, 115 Cal. 622, 47 Pac. 597 (1897) ;
Hitchcock v. Hassett, 71 Cal. 331, 12 Pac. 228 (1886) ; Howell v. Foster, 65 Cal. 169, 3 Pac. 647
(1884); Wentworth v. Miller, 53 Cal. 9 (1878); Tuohy v. Wingfield, 52 Cal. 319 (1877); Cox
v. Miller, 15 Cal. App. 2d 494, 59 P.2d 628 (1936).
453 Cal. 9 (1878).
43 65 Cal. 169, 3 Pac. 647 (1884).
44 79 Cal. 575, 21 Pac. 955 (1889).
45 92 Cal. 497, 28 Pac. 592 (1891).
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cash rentals, when the court refered to the interest of the owner as "ownership or a lien."
Then, in Stockton Say. & L. Soc. v. Purvis,4 6 again involving retention
of title until delivery of the crop by the cultivator to the owner, it was held
that such a provision was a mere attempt to create a secret lien on personal
property, which was void as against creditors of the cultivator. But Howell
v. Fosterwas excluded from the "secret lien" rule, on the grounds that the
rent there was payable in kind. This decision was followed by a series of
cases expanding on the theme, each one pushing the boundary of permissible clauses a bit further back. Finally, in Crocker v. Cunningham,47 involving a retention of title clause in an agreement calling for a division of
the crop, the court indicated that Howell v. Fosterwas in serious doubt, by
holding the retention provision invalid.
In Summerville v. Stockton Milling Company,4 s the court indicated
that its objection to the retention of title in the owner was solely based on
the "secret lien" theory when it upheld such a provision in a lease which
had been recorded before the adverse claimant obtained his rights. Subsequent cases, with but few exceptions, have continued the same line of
reasoning.
The only cases indicating the possibility of a different result have been
extremely weak. One of them, Tuohy v. Linder, 9 involved a chattel mortgagee under the cultivator, who sought to protest the owner's right without
first seeking to foreclose his mortgage, or otherwise prove a right to possession. In giving judgment for the owner, the court based its decision on
the failure of the mortgagee to show any right to the crop, but indicated a
possible return to the older rule, citing Howell. And in Gates v. Quong,50
the court, although conceding the point, questioned whether a cultivator
in possession under an agreement giving the owner the full right to direct
sale of a crop, had any mortgagable interest in the crop.
Another form of agreement, less frequently encountered, is one providing that the cultivator will execute, in favor of the owner, a crop mortgage
to secure the payment of cash rentals. One case held that mere knowledge
of the existence of a lease does not put a third party on notice of such an
unusual agreement,51 but in a later decision it was held that one with actual
notice of such a provision is bound by it, inasmuch as the provision is in
52
the nature of an equitable lien on the crop.
46 112 Cal. 236, 44 Pac. 561 (1896).
47 122 Cal. 547, 55 Pac. 404 (1898).
48 142 Cal. 529, 76 Pac. 243 (1904).
49 144 Cal. 790, 78 Pac. 233 (1904).
50 3 Cal. App. 443, 85 Pac. 662 (1906).
51
Wilkerson v. Thorp, 128 Cal. 221, 60 Pac. 679 (1900).
52
Cox v. Miller, 15 Cal.App.2d 494, 59 P.2d 628 (1936) ; Nau v. Santa Ana Sugar Co.,
79 Cal. App. 685, 250 Pac. 705 (1926).
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Thus, the California courts have been quick to strike down any attempts to obtain an advantage for the owner at the expense of third parties
without notice of peculiar provisions in the agreements under which the
cultivator takes possession. Why this same solicitude has not been shown
those who are asked to determine the nature of an ambiguous agreement
is not clear. It can only be hoped that this same philosophy will be carried
into effect in the categorization problems, so that third parties, with bona
fide claims against crops, will be able to know exactly what the nature of
the rights they have succeeded to may be. Only through affording this certainty will the courts achieve the desired end of promoting the fullest
development of the agricultural potential.
Creation and Extinction of the Crop Mortgage Lien
Prior to the adoption of the Code of 1872, crop mortgages were created
through compliance with the formalities required to create a mortgage of
real property. The lien of the mortgage existed only until the crop was harvested, after which it was terminated unless there was an immediate delivery to the mortgagee.53 Such is no longer the case. Today, the creation and
extinction of crop mortgages is a unique problem, most closely resembling
the problems of chattel mortgages generally, but still involving problems
arising as a result of the older rules and the reasons which led to those rules.
Section 2955 of the Civil Code provides the exclusive means for the
creation of a valid crop mortgage--or so it has been said in many cases
involving the effectiveness of a land mortgage as creating a lien on growing
crops.54 More precisely, a crop mortgage, to be effective as against third
parties must comply with the statutory formalities required for any chattel
mortgage, and be recorded as a crop mortgage.55 As between the parties,
however, any documents which indicate an intent to secure a debt by hypothecation of a crop will be effective to give the creditor rights against
the debtor as to that crop.55 But a land mortgage, even with a rents and
profits clause, does not create any lien on growing crops, as between the
parties or as against third parties even though they may have notice of the
land mortgage, for "no amount of notice can make the real estate mortgage
a crop mortgage."'57 On the other hand, a mortgage executed and recorded
as a crop mortgage, which contained a provision that the real estate de53 Quirique v. Dennis,
54

24 Cal. 154 (1864). See Goodyear v. Williston, 42 Cal. 11 (1871).
See Simpson v. Ferguson, 112 Cal. 180, 40 Pac. 104 (1896).

55 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2955-2978, esp. 2955, 2956, 2957, 2963 and 2964.
56 See Summerville v. Stockton Milling Company, 142 Cal. 529, 76 Pac. 243 (1904) ; Lemon
v. Wolff, 121 Cal. 272, 53 Pac. 801 (1898). CAL. CIV. CODE § 2957.

57 Modesto Bank v. Owens, 121 Cal. 223, 53 Pac. 552 (1898).
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scribed therein was also made security for the debt, was effective to create
a lien on the land as between the parties and third parties with notice.5
Most of the incidents of the crop mortgage are those common to all
chattel mortgages. 9 Thus, delay in recordation of the crop mortgage gives
all creditors who obtain a lien during the period of delay priority over the
crop mortgage, and additionally gives priority to any creditor whose claim
arose during the period of delay, even though he obtains his lien after recordation.6 0 The right of possession of the crop mortgagee, absent some
expression in the contract fixing it expressly, is deemed to accrue when the
debt becomes due,61 and the mortgagee is then entitled to take possession
without foreclosure of the debt.62 These problems, however, are not within
the scope of this paper; rather attention will be focused on the specific
problem of termination of the crop mortgagee's rights through removal of
the crop from the property of the mortgagor, as provided for in Section
2972 of the Civil Code.
As noted above, the rule under the Practice Act of 1856 was that the
lien of a crop mortgage was terminated upon severance of the crop-more
specifically, at the time the crop was in a deliverable state-unless the crop
was delivered immediately to the mortgagee. 3 Under this rule, there could
be but little doubt as to whether or not the mortgagee had a lien on the
crop-if it were cut and in a deliverable condition, he did not. From the
moment the crop was in a deliverable condition, it could be disposed of
to anyone, and the mortgagee would have no claim against the taker; the
mere fact that the crop had been removed from the land of the mortgagor
would be conclusive of the extinguishment of the lien." The mortgagee, to
protect his interests, had to make certain that he received immediate delivery of the crop after harvest. Recordation of the mortgage would protect
the mortgagee while the crop was still part of the land, but as soon as an
actual change of possession-as opposed to the constructive change accomplished through recordation-was possible, it had to be effected, at risk of
loss of the lien. By thus putting the burden of obtaining possession upon
the mortgagee, considerable protection was afforded the innocent purchaser
58

Pacific Fruit Exchange v. Duke, 103 Cal. App. 340, 284 Pac. 729 (1930).

59 See CAL. Civ.

CODE

§§ 2956-57.

60 Ruggles v. Cannedy, 127 Cal. 290, 53 Pac. 911 (1899) is the leading case in this area.
61 Summerville v. Stockton Milling Company, 142 Cal. 529, 76 Pac. 243 (1904) ; Kelley
v. Cochran, 116 Cal. App. 359, 2 P.2d 434 (1931) ; Wixom v. Davis, 57 Cal. App. 620, 207 Pac.
694 (1922). The agreement may provide for immediate possession by mortgagee on default.
See Bank of Woodland v. Duncan, 117 Cal. 412, 49 Pac. 414 (1897).
62
Wixom v. Davis, 57 Cal. App. 620, 207 Pac. 694 (1922). See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2967.
63 Goodyear v. Williston, 42 Cal. 11 (1871).
64 See discussion in Horgan v. Zanetta, 107 Cal. 27, 40 Pac. 22 (1895). See also Valley Bank
v. Hillside Packing Co., 91 Cal. App. 738, 267 Pac. 746 (1928).
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of a crop, who could rely on receiving the crop free from any adverse
claims merely by force of the fact that it was capable of being delivered
to him.
But in 1878, with the enactment of Section 2972 of the Civil Code, a
change was made in the law, giving to the mortgagor a significant additional protection, the section providing that: "The lien of a mortgage on a
growing crop continues on the crop after severance, whether remaining in
its original state or converted into another product, so long as the same
remains on the land of the mortgagor." The mortgagee was now protected
from those who sought to assert adverse claims to the crop while it remained on the land of the mortgagor prior to delivery. Thus, the attaching
creditor of the mortgagor would be unable to levy upon the crop while it
remained on the land. Priority was assured the crop mortgagee, contingent
upon the good faith of the mortgagor in not removing the crop. To a large
extent, this priority of right is the foundation of the entire law of security
transactions. Creditors may be willing to rely on the honesty of debtors,
but wish protection from the insolvency of the debtor. Section 2972 provides just this assurance of priority, although apparently leaving the mortgagee at the mercy of the unscrupulous mortgagor who would remove the
crop for the purpose of selling it to a third party, in derogation of the mortgagee's rights. But surely this is one of the risks which any creditor must
always take-that of dishonesty on the part of the debtor. No more can be
asked of the law than that it insure against the hazards of economic adversity through granting of priority to one creditor against others.
But the fact that the 1878 amendment was a significant expansion of
the mortgagee's rights to a crop seems not to have deterred the courts in
their interpretation of the section so as to provide a protection far greater
than that which could be imagined from a literal reading of the statute.
The law today, as it has been developed in the case by case search for the
most equitable result in the specific instance, is concerned not with the
question suggested by the statute: "Is the crop still on the land of the mortgagor?" but rather, with the question "Was the removal of the crop accomplished in such a fashion as to justify protecting the mortgagee, to the
detriment of those who have taken the crop?"
Statutory Background
An understanding of the law surrounding the problems of termination
of the lien of a crop mortgage requires consideration of four Civil Code
sections:
3440-Establishing a conclusive presumption that every lien on personal property made by one in possession and not followed by
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an immediate change of possession is void as against the transferor's creditors while he remains in possession, and as against
any purchaser or encumbrancer in good faith subsequent to
creation of the lien, except Hens created by mortgages allowed
by law (among other exceptions).65

2957-Rendering void as against creditors of the mortgagor and subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers of the property in good
faith and for value, any mortgage unless recorded.11
2972-Providing that the lien of a mortgage on a growing crop continues on the crop after severance, whether remaining in its original
state or converted into another product, so long as the same
remains on the land of the mortgagor.
2973-Providing that mortgages of personal property not subject to
mortgaging under the code, and mortgages not made in conformity with the provisions of the code are nevertheless valid
between the parties, their heirs, legatees, personal representatives, and persons who, before parting with value, have actual
notice thereof.
Unfortunately, the code sections have been important more in their
absence than their presence in the reported decisions. Rather, the case law
has developed about a group of doctrines which purport to interpret the
language of Section 2972, without reference to any of the other applicable
code provisions, and without distinguishing the various factual situations
which may arise. To facilitate analysis of the problems involved, it is proposed herein to consider the effect of removal of the crops from the land
of the mortgagor in each of five basic fact situations, looking both to the
results of the cases to date, and suggesting alternative analyses based upon
the statutory scheme. A crop on the land of a mortgagor may be removed
in any of the following ways: (1) By one who has no claim of right to the
crop from either the mortgagor or mortgagee; (2) by one claiming through
the mortgagor, either by sale or on attachment under an action against the
mortgagor on a debt; (3) by the mortgagor himself, acting in derogation
of the rights of the mortgagee; (4) by the mortgagor, acting under instructions from the mortgagee; (5) by the mortgagee.
Early cases, involving simple factual situations followed the literal
language of the code to hold that an attaching creditor obtained no rights
6

5 Section 3440 was altered substantially in 1951, but its impact for present purposes is
the same in both pre- and post-1951 versions.
66 In 1946 a provision voiding crop mortgages on crops to be harvested more than 12
months after the date of the mortgage, executed by a tenant unless the tenant held under a
recorded lease referred to in the mortgage, was eliminated from the section.
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in a crop while still on the land of the mortgagor,7 but that an attaching
creditor who levied on a crop three miles off the land of the mortgagor
obtained rights superior to those of the mortgagee."
Removal of crops by one having no rights thereto
Martin v. Thompson,69 the first of the cases to consider critically the
language of Section 2972, involved a type (1) situation, in which the removal of the crop was by one without any rights thereto. The actual issue
in the case was the right of a crop mortgagee to intervene in an action between a landowner and the crop mortgagor who had grown the crop while
in adverse possession of the land. The landowner had taken possession of
the crop immediately after harvest, and then brought action to determine
his rights in the crop. Mortgagee was denied a right to intervene. In an
appeal on the principal action, it was held that the adverse possessor-the
mortgagor-had the prior right in the crop as against the landowner. 70 In
the subsequent appeal from the denial of the petition to intervene, it was
held that the mortgagee was entitled to intervene, inasmuch as his right
in the crop was superior to that of the mortgagor, and that the case was
one in which intervention was clearly appropriate. The court, considering
the effect on the rights of the mortgagee of the removal of the crop from
the land by the landowner noted that the statutes furnished no protection
against an invalid mortgage to those who took mortgaged property without
any claim of right, applying, rather, to creditors and bona fide purchasers
and encumbrancers. Since the landowner did not fall within any of these
classes, there seemed to be no valid reason for holding that Section 2972
required termination of the mortgage lien in his favor. A fair restatement
of the holding of the case would seem to be that the provision of Section
2972, extinguishing the lien of a crop mortgage upon removal of the crop
from the land of the mortgagor, was not to be invoked in favor of one who
was not protected by the general provisions as to validity of a defective
chattel mortgage. The question is not so much that of termination of the
lien, as that of who is able to claim the benefits of the statute.
Analytically, this reasoning would appear to be sound. Unfortunately
later courts, in applying the Martinrule have ignored the factual situation
which led to the language in the opinion about wrongful taking, and attempted to weave the law around the concept of "wrongful removal" in the
abstract.71 There has been no other case found dealing with a removal by
67 Rider v. Edgar, 54 Cal. 127 (1880).
68 Waterman v. Green, 59 Cal. 142 (1881).
69 63 Cal. 3 (1883).
70
Martin v. Thompson, 62 Cal. 618 (1882).
71 See discussion in 14 CAL. JUR. 2d, Crops § 27 (1952).

Aug., 1958]

SECURITY INTERESTS IN CROPS

one without a claim against either mortgagor or mortgagee, but the courts
have continued to talk about wrongful removal, without recognizing that
the original use of the term was in the context of "a removal by one who,
because he has no rights in the crop, is not protected by the statutes dealing
with protection from invalid mortgages." It should be constantly borne in
mind, in considering the later cases in this area, that the original-and, it
is suggested, the correct-application of the "wrongful removal" doctrine
led to departure from the literal language of section 2972 not on the basis
of the nature of taking, but the nature of the taker.
Removal by One Claiming Under Mortgagor
In situation (2) cases, in which the crop is removed from the land by
one who claims under the mortgagor, as by sale or attachment, the term
"wrongful removal" or "tortious removal" has been employed to explain
decisions granting the mortgagee a right of recovery. These cases have developed on the theory that the lien of the mortgage was not extinguished
because of the nature of the acts leading to the taking of the crop. Thus, in
Wilson v. Prouty,7" the forerunner of the situation (2) cases, an action was
brought by the mortgagee against one who had purchased from the mortgagor and removed the crops from the land under the sale agreement. The
court felt that the taking was tortious, since the purchaser had constructive
notice of the mortgage lien when he took the crops. Inasmuch as the taking
was tortious, it was felt that Martin v. Thompson required a holding that
the lien of the mortgage was not extinguished, and the mortgagee was
awarded judgment. Later cases73 have followed the Wilson rule, uniformly
holding that one who enters the land of the mortgagor and removes a crop
under an agreement with the mortgagor, is liable to the mortgagee, on the
theory that the tortious removal does not extinguish the lien.
While the result of these cases is unexceptionable, the reasoning employed in reaching the position is clearly contrary to the statutory language. There can be no question but that the lien of the mortgage is extinguished under the statute. To illustrate the point, consider the rights of a
purchaser from the one who originally removed under the contract with the
mortgagor. Would this sub-purchaser be subject to the rights of the mortgagee? It seems difficult to believe that such a result could pertain.74 If
the original taking does not extinguish the lien, however, how is it to be
extinguished? To answer, as some of the later decisions in other factual
situations appear to have, that the later bona fide purchaser is not bound
Cal. 196, 11 Pac. 608 (1886).
73 Sousa v. Lucas, 156 Cal. 460, 105 Pac. 413 (1909); Bank of Woodland v. Duncan,
117 Cal. 412, 49 Pac. 414 (1897) ; DeCosta v. Comfort, 80 Cal. 507, 22 Pac. 218 (1889).
74
But see text at note 78 infra.
72 70
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by the original tortious removal is simply to restate the true rule of the
Martin case-that the lien is extinguished as to protected classes, but that
the original taker cannot assert this extinction of the lien because he does
not fall within one of these classes. It would be far sounder to recognize
the actual legal consequences of the purchase of the crops on the land of
the mortgagor, which, by normal principles would involve an assumption
of the mortgage debt implied in law through the force of the constructive
notice given by recordation of the mortgage. 5 The mortgagee is then entitled to pursue the crops in the hands of the original purchaser on the
basis of this undertaking; and the original purchaser cannot assert as a
defense to such an action that the lien was extinguished through removal
from the land, for he is not a protected claimant under the code. But the
lien is extinguished, and subsequent takers without actual notice-there no
longer being any basis for constructive notice--can assert the removal as
terminating the lien.
Whether this rationale will ever be adopted is open to question. The
doctrine of tortious removal is firmly imbedded in the law of California, as
witness DeCosta v. Comfort.7 6 In this case the original purchaser from the
mortgagor made an express assumption of the mortgage obligation, promising to pay off the mortgage debt, and apply the balance of the proceeds
of sale of the crops to other debts of the mortgagor. But the court nonetheless dwelt upon the "tortious" nature of the removal in holding him
liable to the mortgagee for the proceeds of sale to the extent necessary to
satisfy the debt. The undertaking to pay the mortgage debt was only incidentally mentioned in the opinion as lending added weight to the tortious
removal theory.
Removal by Mortgagor
The type (3) cases, involving removal by the mortgagor himself, without consent of the mortgagee, have also leaned heavily upon the doctrines
of "tortious removal," with the results dependent upon whether or not the
removal was so classified. But again, in only one instance has there been
any possible difference between application of this theory and that of the
more precise rule of Martin v. Thompson.
These cases generally involve a removal by the mortgagor, followed by
a sale to a third party, after which the mortgagee seeks to assert his lien
on the crops in order to recover from the third party. The first of the series,
7 7 involved a disposal by the mortgagor to one with
Chittenden v. Pratt,
actual notice of the mortgagee's rights. In rendering judgment for the
454 (Bower ed. 1933).
76 80 Cal. 507, 22 Pac. 218 (1889).
77 89 Cal. 178, 26 Pac. 626 (1891).
75 JONES, CrATTEL MORTGAGES §
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mortgagee, the court held that since the defendant had actual notice of the
mortgage, and knew that the lien could not be divested by a wrongful removal, his taking of the crop from the mortgagor was wrongful, and in
the nature of a conversion. In CaliforniaPacking Corp. v. Stone 8 a finding
that the mortgagor had "wrongfully and tortiously removed" crops from
his land was sufficient to lead to affirmance of a judgment against one who
had taken from the mortgagor, in an opinion which does not indicate
whether or not the taker from the mortgagor had notice of the mortgagee's
rights.
If these cases represented the law, it would be clear that a substantial
injustice was being done to all who purchase crops. If the conversion language of Chittenden is taken at its face value, it would seem that any person who thereafter bought the crop would be liable to the mortgagee. Bona
fides would be no defense to the action in conversion, under normal principles of tort law. 9 And the California Packing decision would indicate
that we look not to the nature of the act of the purchaser from the mortgagor, but rather to the nature of the acts of the mortgagor himself in
effecting the removal.
Other cases, however, indicate a contrary result. While they are logically indistinguishable if we assume the "tortious removal" rationale, it is
suggested that the distinction drawn by this article, based on the Martin v.
Thompson rule will serve to reconcile them. Thus, in Horgan v. Zanetta, 0
where the mortgagor, during harvest, removed the crops as severed to the
land of the defendant, who at the time of removal had no actual noticealthough note that he must have had constructive notice-of the mortgagee's rights, it was held that a later attachment by the defendant was
valid as against the mortgagee, even though defendant had meanwhile
gained actual knowledge of the mortgagee's rights. On the basis of the facts
in the other "mortgagor removal" cases, there is simply no basis for distinguishing the acts of the mortgagor. The removal was no more and no less
tortious in this case than in any other case, yet the court held that where
the one with whom a crop is stored does not know of the existence of a
mortgage, then the mortgagor's removal extinguishes the lien on the crop.
A result similar in essence, although based on a theory of "estoppel" was
reached in a later case. 8 An even more significant inroad on the "tortious
78 64 Cal. App. 488, 222 Pac. 193 (1923).
79
PROSSER, TORTS 68 (2d ed. 1955).
80 107 Cal. 27, 40 Pac. 22 (1895). The case is explained in Valley Bank v. Hillside Packing
Co, 91 Cal. App. 738, 267 Pac. 746 (1928), as involving lack of diligence on the part of the
mortgagor in protecting his interests after harvest. This facile explanation of the case sounds
much like the pre-1872 rule of termination by severance. See note 64 supra. There appears no
basis in the case for this interpretation.
81
Bell v. Central Bank, 89 Cal. App. 551, 265 Pac. 551 (1928). But see Pacific Fruit Exchange v. F. E. Booth Co., 103 Cal. App. 54, 283 Pac. 944 (1930).
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removal" doctrine as applied to the type (3) cases is the rule that removal
creates a prima facie case that the lien has been extinguished, which the
mortgagee must overcome through proving the tortious nature of the removal in order to assert his lien.82 Just what the nature of the mortgagee's
proof would have to be has never been made clear, although the fact that
this doctrine has not been invoked in favor of takers with notice, but has
been used in cases in which the taker was a bona fide purchaser 83 may indicate the result which is obtained through use of this pleasant little fiction.
This series of cases probably demonstrates better than any other the
inadequacy of the "tortious removal" doctrine. In attempting to apply it,
the courts have been forced to all manner of countervailing rationalizations, when the basic test of the Martin case would serve to provide ready
answers, without resort to additional fictions. The removal clearly defeats
the lien as against protected claimants. The only source of inquiry should
be whether the possessor of the crop against whom the mortgagee seeks to
assert his rights is within the protected classifications. If the defendant
obtained his rights in the crop after removal from the land, and before gaining knowledge of the interests of the mortgagee, he should be protected.
But if he is a purchaser or encumbrancer with actual notice, or a creditor
who gained his rights after acquiring notice of the mortgagee's rights in the
crop, then there is no basis in the code for offering protection.
Removal by Mortgagorat Instance of Mortgagee
Another series of cases which has presented considerable difficulty is
that dealing with the rights following removal by the mortgagor at the instance of the mortgagee-situation (4). Here the courts have struggled
with a variety of conflicting doctrines, including tortious removal, waiver,
and "substitution of personal obligation." The basic factual situation is
simple: Following harvest, mortgagee instructs mortgagor as to disposition
of the crop. But there are sixteen possible combinations. The instructions
may be to store or to sell, to either a specified party or at the mortgagor's
discretion. The mortgagor may comply with the instructions or ignore
them. And the person to whom sold, or with whom stored, may or may not
know of the mortgage. While only a sampling of these situations is afforded
by the cases, sufficient confusion has been engendered to render the paucity
of authority not altogether unfortunate.
82 Ramsey v. California Packing Corp., 51 Cal. App. 517, 201 Pac. 481 (1921) (citing
Horgan v. Zanetta, note 80 supra, and Gates v. Quong, 3 Cal. App. 443, 85 Pac. 662 (1906)
(involving a rightful removal by a third party)).
83 Valley Bank v. Hillside Packing Co., 91 Cal. App. 738, 267 Pac. 746 (1928) ; Ramsey
v. California Packing Corp., 51 Cal. App. 517, 201 Pac. 481 (1921). See Horgan v. Zanetta,
107 Cal. 27, 40 Pac. 22 (1895), explained in Valley Bank as a "prima fade extinguishment" case.
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Byrnes v. Hatch8 hinted at a possible rule in favor of the mortgagee,
in a totally irrelevant dictum, when it was said that the fact that a crop was
hauled to a warehouse at the direction of the mortgagee may have been sufficient to preserve the lien of the mortgage. It was later said 5 that this rule
was brought to flower by Campodonico v. Oregon Improvement Co. s6 The
basis for such a statement is open to question. In the Campodonico case,
an action in conversion was brought against a warehouseman, based on
allegations that the crop as to which plaintiff mortgagee claimed a lien,
had been shipped under instructions for storage in the name of the mortgagee. The warehouseman, despite repeated demands for issuance of receipts in the name of the mortgagee, persisted in issuing them to the mortgagor. The crops were attached, and soon thereafter the mortgagor became
insolvent. Affirming judgment for the mortgagee, the court held that the
lien of the mortgage was not lost through the neglect of the warehouseman
to issue a proper receipt for the crops. But this holding seems truly irrelevant to the decision. The question of whether or not the lien persisted might
better have been determined in an action by the mortgagee against the
assignee in bankruptcy. In the action against the warehouseman for conversion, the only issue is whether there was such a substantial interference
with the rights of the mortgagee as to entitle him to recovery of the value
of the crop.8 7 Clearly there was.
But the theory that the mortgagor can be constituted the agent of the
mortgagee for the handling of the property after removal from the land
seems firmly embedded in the case law in this field, despite the repugnance
to such transactions when a conveyance is being attacked as fraudulent.8 8
Following this theory, the removal of the crop by the mortgagor is, in
effect, a removal by the mortgagee, which gives rise to a new possessory
lien in behalf of the mortgagee. 9 And yet, despite the broad language of
the opinions, it appears that the actual decisions are of rather narrow scope.
0 mortgagee sought recovery of funds held by deIn Gower v. Bertrand,"
fendant, to whom mortgagor had delivered his entire crop under an agreement to sell entered into before the mortgage. Defendant claimed a right to
the funds for repayment of advances to mortgagor made before and after
the execution of the mortgage, and before and after notification by mort84 77 Cal. 241, 19 Pac. 482 (1888).
8

5 Campodonico v. Santa Maria B. & G. Co., 86 Cal. App. 339, 260 Pac. 830 (1927).
86 87 Cal. 566, 25 Pac. 763 (1891).
8T
PROSSER, TORTS 74 (2d ed. 1955).
88 See, e.g., Murphy v. Mulgrew, 102 Cal. 547, 36 Pac. 857 (1894) ; Southern California
Collection Co. v. Napkie, 106 Cal. App.2d 565, 235 P.2d 434 (1951); Pfahler v. Worcester,
56 Cal. App. 384, 205 Pac. 491 (1922).
89 See note 100 infra.
90 44 Cal. App. 233, 186 Pac. 172 (1919).
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gagee of his claims thereunder. The trial court gave judgment to mortgagee
for the proceeds of the sale of the crops, but permitted defendant to deduct
for amounts advanced prior to receiving notice of the fact that mortgagor
was shipping on mortgagee's behalf. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed,
the court following the rule that shipment on behalf of the mortgagee preserves his lien. But if this is truly the rule, it seems difficult to justify permitting the defendant to retain advances made before receiving notice that
shipments were made on behalf of the mortgagee. The result would seem
to support the position that the lien was destroyed by removal as to those
who had parted with value prior to notice of the mortgagee's rights. But the
court espouses the opposite rule.
In Campodonico v. Santa MariaB. & G. Co.,9' recovery was permitted
against one who had purchased from the mortgagor following removal and
storage in mortgagor's name, on a showing that the mortgagee had instructed the mortgagor to store the crop in his (mortgagee's) name. Reverting to the "tortious removal" rationale, the court states that removal
under instructions from the mortgagee, where the mortgagor wrongfully
puts the property in his own name does not act to end the mortgagee's lien
on the crop. But the action here was against a purchaser from the mortgagor with notice of the claims of the mortgagee, or so it would seem. The
court notes that the purchaser had both actual and constructive notice of
the mortgage; the constructive notice suggestion would tend to support the
position that the lien was actually saved, but certainly it is not necessary
to the decision, inasmuch as there was actual notice.
Following the agency theory and the tortious removal theory to their
logical conclusions would lead to preservation of the lien in every case of
removal by the mortgagor. If he adheres to the mortgagee's instructions,
he acts as agent, creating a possessory lien. If he disobeys, he acts tortiously, and this preserves the lien.
The more recent cases have reached an opposite result, on the doctrine
of "waiver.' 9 2 In distinguishing the Campodonico line of cases, emphasis
has been placed upon the fact that in them the instructions from the mortgagee to the mortgagor were specific-i.e., sell the crop to Joe Vendee,
whereas the instructions in the case being considered are general-i.e., sell
the crop. It would seem that the logical distinction between the two situations is somewhat ephemeral. To say that the mortgagee who instructs his
mortgagor to sell to, or store with, a specific party is constituting the mortgagor his agent, whereas the mortgagee who instructs the mortgagor merely
9186 Cal. App. 339, 260 Pac. 830 (1927).
92 1. S. Chapman & Co. v. Ulery, 15 Cal. App. 2d 452, 59 P.2d 602 (1936) ; Haber v. J. G.
Boswell Co., 130 Cal. App. 514, 20 P.2d 100 (1933). See Ramsey v. California Packing Corp.,
51 Cal. App. 517, 201 Pac. 481 (1921).
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to sell, or to store, is waiving his lien on the crop, reads far more into a
verbal distinction than is warranted. Occasionally this "reasoning" is buttressed by reflections on the tortious removal theme, with the courts saying
that removal in cases in which the mortgagor complies with the instructions has been consented to, and is therefore not tortious, so that the lien
is ended,93 at least if the instructions are general; but that where the removal is made in a manner other than that instructed-normally, where
the mortgagor stores in his own name after having been instructed to store
in the name of the mortgagee-that it is tortious, and that the lien endures.9" The net result of all of this language, taken at face value, would be
that the lien is preserved only if the instructions are specific and the mortgagor disobeys them. Where instructions are general, or where the mortgagor complies with them, the lien is lost.
A similar but clearly distinguishable problem should be noted here.
Assuming that the mortgagee has a claim against the warehouseman or
purchaser, what are his rights as against other creditors of the mortgagor,
following sale of the crop? If the purchaser has not yet paid the price to
the mortgagor, may the mortgagee claim priority as to the amount due,
or is it subject to attachment by general creditors? The rule applicable to
such situations was clearly stated in Maier v. Freeman9 5 to be that the lien
of the mortgage does not extend to the proceeds of sale of the crop. Despite
this holding, occasional cases appear to give the mortgagee the prior right
to the proceeds on the agency theory.9
One of the few cases which clearly presented this problem was that of
McIntyre v. Hauser," an action by an attaching creditor against one who
had purchased mortgaged property under an express agreement providing
that the price due was to be paid to the mortgagee. It was held that the
agreement under which the property was acquired gave the mortgagee a
direct right to the proceeds, with no attachable interest remaining in the
mortgagor. The court is careful to distinguish the case in which the claim
of the mortgagee is based solely upon his lien, noting that the sale of the
property obviously gives no rights as to the price due. The importance of
the McIntyre case lies in the most unusual factual situation there involved,
and the fact that the court specifically relied, not on the mortgage lien, but
03See cases cited in note 92 supra.
94 Campodonico v. Santa Maria B. & G. Co., 86 Cal. App. 339,260 Pac. 830 (1927); Crosby
v. Fresno Fruit Growers Co., 30 Cal. App. 308, 158 Pac. 1070 (1916) ; I. S. Chapman & Co. v.
Ulery, 15 Cal. App.2d 452, 59 P.2d 602 (1936) (dictum). See Campodonico v. Oregon Improvement Co., 87 Cal. 566, 25 Pac. 763 (1891).
95 112 Cal. 8, 44 Pac. 357 (1896).
90 Crosby v. Fresno Fruit Growers Co, 30 Cal. App. 308, 158 Pac. 1070 (1916).
97131 Cal. 11, 63 Pac. 69 (1900).
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on the implied assignment of the debt due the mortgagor, or, alternatively,
a third party beneficiary theory. When, in Consolidated Produce Co. v.
Takahashi," it was said that "Under certain circumstances the mortgagee
may claim the proceeds from a wrongful sale," citing McIntyre, it would
seem that it was rather severely restricting the earlier cases implying some
special claim to the price due on a sale of crops by the mortgagor under
instructions from the mortgagee.
Under the Martin v. Thompson rationale, it is apparent that the cases
involving removal under instructions should be judged by the same standards as those involving removal on the mortgagor's own initiative. Certainly
the agency rationale, where there is no evidence of knowledge to third
parties of this relationship, are directly opposed to the cases interpreting
section 3440."9 The appropriate inquiry should be directed toward notice.
The removal has terminated the lien of the mortgage as against all protected classes of adverse claimants. The doctrine of waiver is an independent one, and should not be injected into determination of whether the
mortgagee may otherwise assert his lien against the crops.
Removal by Mortgagee
The type (5) situations have involved little difficulty. Where the mortgagee himself takes possession of the crop on the land of the mortgagor
and removes it for storage and/or sale, it seems reasonably clear that the
rights of the mortgagee should be superior to those of anyone claiming
under the mortgagor. This is the very transaction which the codes, by indirection, contemplate. Upon harvesting, the mortgagee will take possession of the crop and convert his lien which had hitherto existed by virtue
of the recordation of the mortgage into a possessory lien. And this is the
result which the cases have consistently reached. 100
It is the position of the author that the doctrine of tortious removal has
no place in the law of security transactions involving crops. As has been
suggested above, the statements in the cases to the effect that a removal is
or is not tortious, and that certain legal consequences flow therefrom, are
merely expressions of a result. Unfortunately, the courts continue to attempt to cope with this meaningless term, and to rationalize results through
ignoring the logically inevitable consequence of the doctrine, which would
require that once a taking is wrongful, the crop may be traced into the
98 52 Cal. App. 2d 753, 127 P.2d 281 (1942). But see Kuehn v. Don Carlos, 5 Cal. App. 2d
25, 41 P.2d 585 (1935).
99 See note 90 supra.
100 Summerville v. Stockton Milling Company, 142 Cal. 529, 76 Pac. 243 (1904) ; Valley
Bank v. Hillside Packing Co., 91 Cal. App. 738, 267 Pac. 746 (1928) (dictum). See McDevitt
v. Jones, 60 Cal. App. 773, 214 Pac. 661 (1923). See also Byrnes v. Hatch, 77 Cal. 241, 19 Pac.
482 (1888). Cf. Campodonico v. Oregon Improvement Co., 87 Cal. 566, 25 Pac. 763 (1891).
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hands of whomsoever has acquired it, without regard to notice or good
faith. Despite these shortcomings, it was said in Valley Bank v. Hillside
Packing Co.1 1 that: °
It follows logically that if the crop happen to be removed through no act
or permission or carelessness of the mortgagee it has been removed tortiously and, therefore, no legal rights should be gained or lost through such
act. [And it] follows that the rights of creditors of the mortgagor and
purchasers subsequent to removal should not be inferior to the lien if the
crop has been removed through consent or lack of reasonable diligence of
the mortgagee to protect his interest after harvest.
Finally, in adverting to the cases involving removal by the mortgagee, the
court notes that the mortgagor's removal of the crops without consent
would be tortious, but that if removed with consent the lien would be lost.
This explains, it is stated, the holding that if the mortgagee himself takes
possession after harvest and removes the crop, the actual possession succeeds the symbolic possession of recordation, and "the lien is not to be distinguished (sic). "103 This discussion appears to ignore the problem of removal with consent of the mortgagee in those cases in which the mortgagor
disobeys instructions. Nor does it successfully explain why consent to
removal should, in cases in which instructions are specific, constitute the
mortgagor an agent, but in cases where they are general, "substitute the
personal obligation of the mortgagor."
If the development of the law is to be accomplished through manipulation of the requirements for finding a removal "tortious" or "consented
to," no real harm is done, so long as the courts are careful to take note of
the unexpressed elements of notice and good faith. But it can hardly be
said that the Valley Bank rationale provides a sound or equitable basis
for determining the rights of various parties in a crop. Under this rule the
housewife purchasing produce at a market is liable to the mortgagee in
conversion, if the mortgagee can show that he exercised the required degree
of care in protecting his rights following harvest. Such a result, logically
inescapable under this theory, provides its own answer.
Fortunately there is authority, although of questionable value, which
considers the problem of notice in its relationship to the doctrine of tortious
removal. Ramsey v. CaliforniaPacking Corp."'4 was an action by a mortgagee against a purchaser without actual or constructive notice of the
10191 Cal. App. 738, 267 Pac. 746 (1928).
10 2 Id. at 740-41, 267 Pac. at 747, citing Horgan v. Zanetta, 107 Cal. 27, 40 Pac. 22 (1895).
See note 80 supra.
103 91 Cal. App. at 741, 207 Pac. at 747. It is assumed the court means "extinguished." If
the word "distinguished" was purposefully used, the possibilities are intriguing.
104 51 Cal. App. 517, 201 Pac. 481 (1921).
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mortgage lien. It was held that the rights of the purchaser were superior
to those of the mortgagee, on the grounds that the mortgagee had not overcome the prima facie case of extinguishment arising from removal. Insofar
as this is the entirety of the holding, it adds but little to the protection
afforded innocent purchasers. But there is language in the opinion recognizing expressly these rights. The court, emphasizing that there was no
notice of the mortgage because of faulty recordation, categorized the defendant as a bona fide purchaser, who would not, it was said, be bound by
a tortious removal. It is indicated that there are two elements involved
in asserting the mortgagee's rights to the crop: He must show that the
removal was unconsented, and also show connivance or knowledge on the
part of the purchaser. The California Supreme Court, in denying review, 10 5
expressly refused to pass on the language regarding the effect of faulty
recordation, basing its affirmance on the failure to show that the removal
was tortious.
Ramsey is the only case which has expressly recognized the difference
between one with and one without notice, except insofar as knowledge
makes the removal tortious where the removal is made by one claiming
under the mortgagor. Rather, the cases have emphasized the nature of the
act of removal in determining the rights of the mortgagee. As pointed out
above, the results of the cases have not been, to the most extent, different
than they would had the words of the statute been applied as originally
suggested in Martin v. Thompson. 0 6 Until the courts recognize the potential of their decisions emphasizing the nature of the removal, and turn their
attention to the status of the adverse claimant, there remains the danger
of a real subversion of the statutory scheme of protection.

105 Id. at 521, 201 Pac. at 482.
106 See California Packing Corp. v. Stone, 64 Cal. App. 488, 222 Pac. 193 (1923), the only
case in which it appears that the result may actually have been contrary to that which would
have been reached under the theories advanced herein.

